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Abstract
This paper shows that investment in human capital may be another reason
for incentive wages in addition to "retain, recruit and motivate". It is shown
under which circumstances rms pay wages in excess of the market clearing level
in order to induce workers to invest. Investment in human capital is inecient
when workers can determine it due to rent sharing and sunk costs.
1. Introduction
In this note, we want to show that incentive wage considerations may lead to un-
employment, if there is a surplus to be divided stemming from investment in human
capital. It is argued that the extraction of investment in human capital is costly for
the rm and that rm's production costs may be reduced if it pays a wage in excess
of the market clearing level. This provides another rationale for the widely accepted
observation of eciency wages in addition to shirking (Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)),
turnover (Stiglitz (1984) and Salop (1979)), adverse selection (Weiss (1980)) and fair
wage models (Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof and Yellen (1988)).
The model is constructed such that in the reference scenario, a social planner can
determine investment in human capital, the bonus payment for it and the demand
for work in order to maximize the rent generated by investment in human capital.
If the workers can determine the investment into human capital themselves, the rm
may have to set incentive wages that do not clear the labour market in order to
motivate the workers for human capital investments. It is, however, also possible that
an employment guarantee of the rm combined with incentive wages makes the rm
better o.
The note is structured as follows. In the second section, the structure of the model
specifying the prot function of the rm and the surplus function of the workers is
given. In the third section, the reference scenario with the social planner setting all
parameters, the eciency wage scenario with the workers determining the investment
in human capital, and the cooperation scenario with side payments of the rm are
calculated. In the fourth section the conclusions are discussed.
2. The structure of the model
2.1. The rm
The rm maximizes its prots. We assume that the production function of the rm
is of Cobb-Douglas type
1
. The revenues of the rm depend on the number of workers
and the homogeneous level of new human capital gained by the workers in the last
period. The rm pays a "basic" wage w and a bonus b dependent on the level of new
human capital. Its prot is:
 = Al

c
1 
  (bc+ w)l (2.1)
with 0 <  < 1.
Here the price of the good produced is normalized to unity and l denotes the
number of workers demanded, while A is an eciency parameter. The variable c
denotes specic new human capital per worker and it is assumed that without this
specic human capital that is gained in the last period, production is not possible.
On the other hand, this special human capital is just usable in the rm and not in
other employment relations.
2
The parameter b is the bonus paid for the specic new
human capital needed in the rm and w is the "basic wage" per worker that is not
related to the level of human capital, i.e. for unschooled labour.
2.2. The workers
The workers optimize individually their surplus that is dened as the monetary income,
taking into account the consequences on labour demand of the rm. We assume that
there is a pool of L homogeneous workers for the representative rm. The focus is
therefore on the rm-specic labour market and not on the entire demand for labour.
It is assumed that only a part of the labour market is suitable for a job at the rm,
e.g. workers in the same branch or recently dismissed labourers of the rm. Therefore
all statements about "full employment" and underemployment are with respect to the
rm-specic pool of workers. If labour demand is smaller than the pool of workers,
then every worker faces by assumption the same chance to lose her job, i.e. the rm
does not distinguish between workers and res at random. For the workers there is
a trade-o between the investment in human capital and the certainty to be able to
1
The production function with homogeneous labour input and human capital input is similar to
the formulation in Lindbeck and Snower (1991), p. 194. The eort part is substituted by new human
capital. Hereby it is implicitly assumed that higher specic job skills lead to higher productivity
(such as higher eort leads to higher productivity).
2
This is actually the denition of "special human capital", see Becker (1983) pp. 26 .
2
keep the job, because the labour demand of the rm is falling when human capital
(and therefore productivity) is smaller.
3
The employees are therefore not interested
in total labour demand, but in relative labour demand with respect to labour supply
L.
The surplus function of a representative worker is specied as
4
:
s =
l
L
(bc+ w) +
L  l
L
s  (1 + r)c
2
(2.2)
Here, the workers earn the wage in the primary labour market plus the bonus
with chance
l
L
; while they have to subtract the investment in specic capital for sure.
Investment costs are quadratic in human capital. The outside option s is obtained
with chance
L l
L
. The outside option may be equal to the basic wage rate w, if the
workers are able to nd a job elsewhere where they just get paid the wage of unschooled
workers, because they can't use their specic human capital. The outside option may
even be lower, if the workers become unemployed. It may be argued, however, that the
outside option may be even higher than the basic wage, if the workers are risk-averse
and the rm has to oer a risk-premium in order to get workers to investment at all.
But it is not necessary to specify the level of the outside option in relation to the basic
wage. Therefore we just say, that s  w.
The investment in specic human capital is assumed to show decreasing returns
to scale, or the costs of investment are increasing more than proportionally. As the
investment is done in the previous period, the costs for specic human capital have to
be multiplied by (1 + r), where r is the exogeneous rate of interest (or in equilibrium
the discount rate of the workers).
If l  L, the surplus function of the workers reads as:
s = (bc + w)  (1 + r)c
2
(2.3)
Here it is certain that the workers will stay employed and earn the wage premium in
the primary labour market w plus the bonus bc, but have to subtract the costs for
specic human capital.
3. Dierent scenarios
3.1. The reference scenario
In this benchmark scenario, the social planner can set all parameters in order to
maximize the rent generated. One way to calculate this is to assume that this rent is
entirely given to the rm and therefore prots are maximized. The optimal prot can
3
This is only valid for the relevant larger values of human capital investment.
4
This is the formulation for the objective functions of workers (unions) most widely used, compare
e.g. Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), p. 100, Carlin and Soskice (1990), p. 391 and Carrut and
Oswald (1987), p. 433.
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be calculated by maximizing  with respect to c and l. The resulting level of prot
is negatively related to the bonus paid. If the rm sets the bonus b equal to zero in
order to maximize its prots, the workers are not willing to invest for a job that gives
them an expected prot lower than their outside option, however. Therefore the lower
bound for b is such that the surplus of the workers is the outside option s. If the prot
function of the rm (2.1) is maximized under the constraint that the workers earn at
least their outside option, i.e.
s =
l
L
(bc+ w) +
L  l
L
s  (1 + r)c
2
=
 
s
(3.1)
the resulting investment and labour demand are:
c
r
=
(1  )A
2(1 + r)L
 
A
s
!

1 
(3.2)
l
r
=
(1  )A
2(1 + r)L
 
A
s
!
1+
1 
(3.3)
Labour demand and investment in human capital react parallel to changes in the
parameters. Labour demand increases with the eciency of investment and decreases
with its costs. Notice that the labour demand of the rm declines with the number of
workers available. This result is due to the fact that if the likelihood of the worker to
be employed declines by a given labour demand, i.e. if the pool of workers increases,
then a higher bonus has to be oered in order to compensate for the expected loss of
sunk investment costs. Labour demand may be lower or higher than the number of
workers in the pool, L. However, this scenario is only consistent for l < L, i.e. there
is job uncertainty for the workers. A critical parameter in this respect is the outside
option, s. The higher the outside option of the worker that has to be oered, the
lower is the labour demand of the rm. The critical value of s is:
s

= A
2
1+
 
(1  )
2(1 + r)L
2
!
1 
1+
(3.4)
Hence the analysis only holds for s  s

. The prot level that is obtained with "full
employment" (or s < s

)) is derived below.
If b is chosen such that the surplus of the workers is equal to the outside option,
or (3.1) is valid, we obtain:
b
r
=
L
l
r
(1 + r)c
r
 
w   s
c
r
(3.5)
Substituting all parameter values obtained into the prot function of the rm gives
then the optimal prot level of the rm with uncertainty for the workers:
4
r
1
=
(1  )
2
A
2
4(1 + r)L
 
A
s
!
2
1 
(3.6)
It can be shown that the rent extracted from the investment in human capital or the
dierence between revenues and costs of the investment is maximized by setting c
r
and b
r
. Therefore investment is socially optimal in this scenario.
5
If s < s

, the rm prefers to employ the entire labour force L. In this case the
prot function of the rm is maximized under the constraint that all workers are
employed and earn at least their outside option (which is derived form the surplus
function without uncertainty (2.3)).
The accompanying prot level is:

r
2
= (1 + )
 
A
2
L
3 1
(1  )
1 
4(1 + r)
1 
!
1
1+
  sL (3.7)
It can be shown that 
r
1
is always larger than 
r
2
when s > s

, and equal if s = s

.
The relevant prot function for the rm is summarized in Figure 1, where the
typical shapes of 
r
1
and 
r
2
are depicted.
6
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Figure 1: The prot function in the reference scenario.
Since "full employment" occurs for s < s

, 
r
2
is the relevant part of the prot function
to the left of F, whereas 
r
1
is the relevant part to the right. The situation for s > s

is characterized by underemployment, in the sense that the rm will not employ the
5
Compare Muysken and Zwick (1996), where the social planner maximizes the rent R generated
by investment in human capital (R = Al

c
1 
  (1 + r)lc
2
).
5
whole relevant labour force. For a given outside option, s, underemployment will be
higher, the lower is s

. That is, the higher are L and r, and the lower A. If the number
of rivals L increases, job uncertainty increases and bonus demand has to increase in
order to match the outside option which reduces the demand for labour l. The same
applies, if the costs of investment r are rising. If the eciency of investment decreases
however, both c and l are less productive and the demand for labour decreases. We
have only discussed the situation in terms of "full employment" (i.e. the employment
of the specic labour pool of the rm) and underemployment, and deliberately not in
terms of full employment and unemployment. This is due to the fact that L relates
to the rm specic labour market.
When we rely on the market mechanism, instead of the social planner, we have
to make a dierence again between the case where there is less labour demand than
supply and that where the entire worker pool is employed. As the investment reaction
function of the workers diers slightly in both cases, we construct two scenarios, the
incentive wage scenario with job uncertainty and the employment guarantee scenario.
3.2. The incentive wage scenario
In the incentive wage scenario, the workers can set their investment in human capital
such that their surplus is maximized at a given bonus/employment combination. The
rm has to set b and l prior to that decision. This is analogous to other eciency
wage models.
The problem of the rm has to be solved by backward induction. Prot is maxi-
mized simultaneously with respect to bonus oer and labour demand taking the reac-
tion function of the workers into account. The human capital supply function of the
workers under uncertainty is derived by maximizing the surplus function (2.2) with
respect to human capital:
c
e
=
lb
2L(1 + r)
(3.8)
The higher the bonus oer and the labour demand of the rm, the higher the motiva-
tion of the workers to invest in human capital. Due to the sunk-cost property of the
investment in special human capital, the investment declines if the chances to stay in
the labour market worsen (i.e.
l
L
decreases). The investment decreases also with the
"price" of investment r.
If we substitute (3.8) into the prot function of the rm (2.1) and maximize for
labour demand and the bonus oer simultaneously, we obtain:
b
e
= 2L(1 + r)
 
w
A
!
1
1 
(3.9)
l
e
=
(1  )A
4L(1 + r)
 
A
w
!
1+
1 
(3.10)
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The labour demand in the incentive wage scenario is always lower than in the reference
scenario with unemployment, given that w  s. The dierence increases with the gap
between outside option and basic wage and with the importance of human capital
for productivity ( increases). In the limit, when human capital has no impact on
productivity ( = 1), both critical values are the same. With incentive wages, the
labour demand of the rm is smaller for all values of , if w < s. This constitutes
our result that the attribution of the right to set investment in human capital for the
workers leads to a reduction in labour demand. This is a consequence of the necessity
to pay incentive wages. Notice that the labour demand of the rm is in this scenario
smaller than L, if w is larger than the following expression:
w

= A
2
1+
 
(1  )
4(1 + r)L
2
!
1 
1+
(3.11)
The smaller the basic wage (or the labour market premium) the cheaper the employ-
ment of labour. It is clear that w

is smaller than s

. This means that underem-
ployment is reached in the incentive wage scenario at a lower exogeneous level of the
basic wage than in the reference scenario. The dierence between w

and s

increases
in . If the basic wage is very small, it is the best for the rm to employ the entire
labour force and we are automatically in the employment guarantee scenario of the
next section. Therefore we assume for the remainder of this section that w > w

.
Notice that if this condition is not fullled, the prot of the rm has a kink, because
not more than L workers are available. The investment in special human capital in
the incentive wage scenario can be calculated now:
c
e
=
(1  )A
4L(1 + r)
 
A
w
!

1 
(3.12)
Also the investment in human capital is smaller than in the reference scenario. As
the workers do not earn the entire rent generated by investment in human capital,
but just the part incentive wages attribute to them, investment is ineciently small.
Notice that due to the investment reaction function of the workers (3.8) the well-
known Solow-condition is fullled in the incentive wage scenario, i.e.
@c
e
@b
e
b
e
c
e
= 1: The
rm minimizes therefore the labour costs per eciency unit of labour.
Substituting the parameter values (3.10), (3.12) and (3.9) into the prot function
of the rm then gives:

e
=
(1  )
2
A
2
8L(1 + r)
 
A
w
!
2
1 
(3.13)
In the incentive wage scenario the prot decreases with the number of workers, because
the motivation of the workers to invest in human capital decreases. The prot of the
rm obviously decreases with the level of the basic wage w. For any reasonable value
7
of s, we nd 
e
< 
r
1
: The prot of the rm decreases of course when the workers are
able to set investment in human capital themselves. The dierence between 
e
and

r
1
decreases in (s  w) and .
The surplus the workers enjoy is analogously derived by substituting (3.10) - (3.9)
into the surplus function of the worker (2.2):
s
e
=
(1  )
4L
2
(1 + r)
 
A

w

!
2
1 
 
1 + 3
4
 
s
w
!
+ s (3.14)
The surplus of the worker is always higher than the outside option, because
s
w
 1.
6
Therefore the rm has to share rents with the workers in this scenario.
3.3. The employment guarantee scenario
It is advantageous for the rm to oer every worker an employment guarantee, because
job uncertainty decreases the motivation of the workers to invest in special human
capital. Moreover, prot no longer increases with a lower real wage according to (3.13)
once all workers are employed. Having a rst-mover advantage, the rm can decide
when an employment guarantee and the assorted bonus oer is prot maximizing. In
this case, the surplus function (2.3) applies and the investment reaction function of
the workers on bonus oer reads as:
c =
b
2(1 + r)
(3.15)
The bonus oer of the rm is then calculated by optimizing the prot function of the
rm (2.1) with respect to b, taking (3.15) into account and setting labour exogeneously.
equal to L. Also in the employment guarantee scenario, the Solow-condition is fullled.
In this case, the attached prot level of the rm and the surplus level of the worker
read as:

f
= (1 + )
 
A
2
L
3 1
(1  )
1 
2
3 
(1 + r)
1 
!
1
1+
  wL (3.16)
s
f
= w +
 
(1  )
2
A
2
16(1 + r)
1 
L
2 2
!
1
1+
(3.17)
The superscript f stands for "full employment". Notice that the surplus level of the
workers is higher than the basic wage w, i.e. the rm gives part of the rent generated
by the investment to the workers. Otherwise the workers would not be motivated to
invest. The investment in human capital is again smaller than in the reference scenario
with job certainty. As in the incentive wage scenario, the prot of the rm is larger
6
We nd s
e
> s as long as w >
4
1+3
s.
8
in the reference scenario with full employment than in the employment guarantee
scenario. The dierence between 
f
and 
r
2
decreases again in (s  w) and .
When comparing both scenarios in the market economy, it can be shown that 
f
is larger than 
e
if w < w

and that both prots are equal if w = w

. That is, as soon
as the wage rate is such that all labour supply will be employed in the incentive wage
scenario, it becomes protable for the rm to guarantee employment. The relevant
prot function for the rm then can be depicted, analogous to Figure 1, in Figure 2.
6
w

e
; 
f

e

f
-
w

E
Figure 2: The prot function in the market economy.
In this scenario, "full employment" occurs for w < w

. Therefore, 
f
is the relevant
part of the prot function to the left of E, whereas 
e
is relevant to the right. As in the
reference scenario, for a given wage level w, underemployment will be higher the lower
is w

. Comparative statics reveal, that also under market conditions underemployment
increases with L and r and decreases with A also under market conditions.
4. Conclusions
In this model, it is shown that in a market economy, where workers set their investment
in human capital leads to less employment, in comparison to the reference scenario,
when a social planner can determine this investment. The model can be summarized
in Figure 3 below:
9
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
s

w; s

Figure 3: The prot function in the reference scenario and the market economy.
The prot in the reference scenario is dependent on the outside option, while in the
other scenarios, it is related to the basic wage. If the impact of human capital on pro-
ductivity and the gap between outside option and basic wages increases, the critical
level of basic wage w

(compare point E) that leads to underemployment decreases
in comparison to the level in the reference scenario s

(compare point F). In addi-
tion, labour demand in the reference scenario is always higher than in the incentive
wage scenarios. These results are in line with the eciency wage theory, where the
rm may have to set a higher than market-clearing wage in order to obtain motivated
workers in combination with the threat of underemployment.
7
The notion of stimulat-
ing necessary human capital investments in order to increase labour productivity by
the payment of an incentive bonus provides therefore a further rationale for eciency
wages in addition to "retain, recruit and motivate".
8
Investment in human capital is ineciently low when the workers set it in the
context of a market economy. This is due to the rent-sharing between workers and
rms that attributes part of the rent to the rm. The workers are forced to share rents,
because the rm sets the bonus demand in relation to investment and can determine
labour demand. In this setting the rm has a motivation to determine the bonus
payment higher than the market clearing level if the basic wage is above w

, although
7
Compare e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
8
Compare Layard et al (1991) pp.150 .
10
it would employ all available workers if it could set investment in human capital itself
for all values of the outside option smaller than s

. The critical wage level is high
with high investment eciency and low with high investment costs and many rival
workers. The last phenomenon is due to the fact that investment is sunk and that
the motivation of the workers to invest in human capital decreases when the chance
to obtain a job at the rm decreases.
We show in this partial equilibrium model which impact the possibility of the
workers to determine their investment in human capital has on the labour market
performance compared to a social planner solution. The focus is restricted in this case
to one rm with a certain pool of workers that require specic skills. All statements
are with respect to the employment of this pool of workers. It will be subject to
future research to aggregate that model to a general equilibrium model where the
unemployment level of the economy can be determined.
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